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Abstract

This paper reports on a research project that aims to reduce the cost of governmentled aerospace system development projects while accelerating schedules and improving
performance. The incentives produced by standard requirements-based contracting
lead to sub-optimal outcomes from the perspective of the government. We create a
contract that incentivizes optimization rather than using requirements. The incentives
align cost savings, rapid development, and higher quality with contractor profit. The
contractor is paid more for a product with higher performance, and even more for
a product that is delivered sooner. Therefore, the contractor can balance cost, performance and time in the way that the government would prefer. Superior program
outcomes arise naturally from the incentives in the contract.
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Introduction

It is no secret that government-led aerospace projects suffer from widespread cost overruns,
schedule overruns, and sub-optimal quality. Previous research suggests that these issues may
partially stem from a much broader problem: the intrinsic misalignment of incentives present
in a standard requirements-based engineering contract. However, there is an alternative:
value-driven design. In this paper, we seek to build upon previous research by showing what
this concept may look like in the context of a broadcast satellite.

1.1

Terminology

For the purposes of this paper:
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• Benefit refers to the anticipated value that will be gained from a product. In general,
this is the probabilistic expectation of net present value. Benefit includes operation,
maintenance and support costs, but excludes engineering costs, manufacturing costs,
and purchase price, which are all considered separately.
• Engineering cost refers to the total cost expended designing the product. This includes
the wages of engineers, the cost of creating prototypes, and operating costs for the
department working on the project.
• Manufacturing cost is the cost of manufacturing the product, including all overhead.
• In the case of products intended for use in orbit, launch cost refers to the cost associated
with launching the product.

1.2

Research Questions

The four overarching questions on which this research is based are as follows.

1. What is the causal relationship among cost reimbursement, award fees, incentives, and
project outcomes?
2. How is this relationship affected by the structural complexity and size of the industry
engineering organization, including the supply chain?
3. How is this relationship affected by program uncertainty, particularly technical risk?
4. How is this relationship affected by uncertainty in the user environment, that is, by
out year changes in the relationship of artifact attributes to government benefit?

This paper will focus primarily on the first of these questions, but will also touch on the
second and third.
4

1.3

Scope

This paper will focus on the application of Acquisition Theory to a model based on the
satellite presented in Kannan, Mesmer, and Bloebaum’s 2016 paper Incorporation of Risk
Preferences in a Value-Based Systems Engineering Framework for a Satellite System [1]. It
will specifically focus on the development of a broad framework for understanding the incentives at play, while a more detailed analysis of the interactions among individual subsystem
designs are reserved for future research.
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Literature Review

This section will give a brief overview of the relevant research up to this point.

2.1

Principal-Agent Theory

Principal-Agent Theory was developed in 1976 by Michael Jensen and William Meckling [2].
This theory draws from the principles of property rights, agency, and finance and attempts
to explain the interactions involved in the relationship between ownership and control over a
firm. Specifically, it deals with the ways in which the principal and the agent are conflicted
in their interests.
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2.2

Value-Based Acquisition

Value-Based Acquisition describes a method of contracting in which the value of a contract
is found using an agreed-upon objective function based on the attributes of the design. Paul
Collopy has done extensive writing on this topic, including an analysis on the negative impact
of direct requirements [3] and evaluations of existing projects through this lens [4]. The
objective function in this contract can be used to align the incentives of the government (the
Principal) and the contractor (the Agent) from a Principal-Agent Theoretical perspective.
The implementation of this idea is one of the primary focuses of our current research.

2.3

The Satellite Model

A 2016 paper by Kannan et al introduced a model of a geo-stationary commercial communications satellite for the purpose of analysis of risk and uncertainty in Value-Based Systems
Engineering (VBSE). This model was adapted for use in this paper.

3

Method

Assume a design D is created through an engineering process. Inherent to this design are a
given set of attributes, including:

• A( D) - The physical artifact that can be made according to design D
• B( D) = B[A( D) ] - the benefit to the government of possessing the artifact A
• N ( D) - the engineering cost of D
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• C( D) = C[A( D) ] - the manufacturing cost of A

For the sake of simplicity, we will treat the artifact A as if it is manufactured instantaneously
at the end of the design process. Additionally, we will view the design process as beginning
at time 0 and ending at time t. Thus, we can assume that both the manufacturing cost and
benefit are incurred at time t.

The engineering cost N will be assumed to be constant throughout the design process, so
its center of gravity will be at time 21 t.
Because the artifact in question is a satellite, an additional cost variable is required, the
launch cost L. We will assume that the launch is scheduled in advance for a time tL , and
that this is when the launch cost is incurred.

We will assume that the preferences of the government and the contractor with respect to
time can be defined by the discount factors rG and rC , respectively, as follows.

rG =

1
1 + drG

(1)

rC =

1
1 + drC

(2)

The discount rate drG is assumed to be 0.07, and drC is assumed to be greater than drG .
For the purposes of this paper, drC will be equal to 0.14.
The most basic scenario is that the government, instead of employing a contractor, designs
and builds the artifact themselves. In this case, the value to the government is given below.
This equation will be used to gauge government preference in cases involving a contractor.
t/2

tL
t
t
VG = rG
· B − rG
· C − rG · N − rG
·L
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(3)

In the case where the government hires a contractor, the contractor’s perception of value will
be based on discounted profit. The equation for this is given below for the simplest case, in
which the government makes one payment of the amount P to the contractor at time t.
t/2

VC = rCt · P − rCt · C − rC · N − rCtL · L

(4)

In order to properly align the incentives of the government and the contractor:

P =

rG
rC

t/2

t
·B−

t/2

t
t
rG − rC
rG
− rCt
rG
− rCt
·
C
−
·
N
−
· L + rC−t · k
t
t/2
rCt
r
rC
C

(5)

This equation is constructed such that at any point in the design space, VG = VC . k is a
constant negotiated before the design process begins, in order to make the contract palatable
to the contractor.

3.1

The Abstract Satellite

A preliminary abstract model of the Satellite was constructed. The purpose of this was to
provide an overview of the problem, and to provide a baseline to which we can compare later
results. The model is as follows.

The satellite has three design variables: volume, design time, and number of transceivers.
In the code, these are represented by the vector x. However, I will refer to them here as V ,
t, and n, respectively, for the sake of readability.

The satellite has a density, d, given by the equation

d=

1
· dwater + e−t+8.9094
2
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(6)

where dwater is the density of water. The surface area of the Satellite is approximated by
SA = 6 · V 2/3

(7)

M =V ·d

(8)

And the mass is calculated by

The maximum number of transceivers is a function of the surface area. For the purposes
of this paper, we will assume that the number of transceivers will always be equal to the
maximum, as this will result in the maximum potential value. Thus,

n = nmax = SA · dtrans

(9)

Where dtrans is the maximum number of transceivers per unit area.
The benefit to the government is given by the following.



B = 108 · 1 − e−0.04·n · t1/2

(10)

There are three primary costs associated with the satellite: engineering cost (N ), manufacturing cost (C), and launch cost (L). These are given below, where w is the yearly operating
cost of the engineering department.

N = w · t + 5000 · n3

(11)

C = (−1.3376 · d + 10666.78) · V

(12)

L = 2000 · M

(13)
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3.2

The Detailed Satellite

In the future, a more complete model of the satellite will be used for analysis, with a focus
on the preferences of the developers of individual subsystems. The structure of the satellite
system is given below.

Figure 1: Satellite Structure
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4

Results

VG and VC were optimized independently using R. The results are given below.
Volume (m3 )

design time (years)

Government

10.4887

5.0120

Contractor

10.5274

5.7462

Table 1: Optimum satellite design variables

Next, V and t were plotted against the value to the government and to the contractor, while
holding the other design variable constant at its optimum.

Figure 2: Volume (m3 ) vs. value to the government ($10M)
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Figure 3: Volume (m3 ) vs. value to the contractor ($10M)

Figure 4: Design time (years) vs. value to the government ($10M)
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Figure 5: Design time (years) vs. value to the contractor ($10M)
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Interpretation

Both the design variable graphs and the optimization results show the convergence of the
interests of the government and the contractor. This implies that the structure of the contract
was successful in aligning the interests of the two parties.
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Conclusion

There are significant issues in the world of government-led contracts, in the aerospace industry and beyond. However, the success of this contract model in aligning the interests of the
government and contractor shows that the future of value-based acquisition is promising,
and that it may serve as a viable alternative to our current methods.

13

Acknowledgments
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant
CMMI-1663109. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in
this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Science Foundation.

14

References
[1] H. Kannan, B. Mesmer, and C. L. Bloebaum, “Incorporation of risk preferences in a
value-based systems engineering framework for a satellite system,” 18th AIAA NonDeterministic Approaches Conference, 2016.
[2] M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, no. 4, p. 305360,
1976.
[3] P. Collopy, “Adverse impact of extensive attribute requirements on the design of complex
systems,” 7th AIAA ATIO Conf, 2nd CEIAT Intl Conf on Innov and Integr in Aero
Sciences,17th LTA Systems Tech Conf; followed by 2nd TEOS Forum, 2007.
[4] I. Maddox, P. Collopy, and P. A. Farrington, “Value-based assessment of dod acquisitions
programs,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 16, p. 1161–1169, 2013.

15

